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I. Introduction
Contract law must provide rules for interpreting the meaning of express
terms and default rules for filling contractual gaps. Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides the same response to both demands: It incorporates
the norms of commercial practice.1 This “incorporation strategy” has recently

*

Prepared for THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW, Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt (eds.), Cambridge University Press
(forthcoming 1999).
1

The incorporation strategy is also adopted in the sales law of other legal systems
and in some treaty law. See, e.g., Belgian Civil Code art. 1134 (1982), United Nations
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come under attack. Although the incorporation strategy for gap-filling seems
to have survived criticism,2 the incorporation strategy for interpretation
remains heavily criticised. Critics charge that the expected rate of interpretive
error under an incorporationist interpretive regime is so excessive that almost
any plain meaning regime would be preferable.
The attack on the incorporation strategy for interpretation is fundamentally
flawed. The best interpretive regime is one that, all else equal, minimizes the
sum of interpretive error costs and the costs of specifying contract terms.3

Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 9(2), 19 Int. Legal Mat.
668 (1980), International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts art. 1.8(2) (1994).
2

See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network
Externalities, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner,
Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate Contracting (“or the Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA L. REV. 713 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution
of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 277 (1997).
3

If an interpretive regime that minimizes the sum of interpretive error and
specification costs has higher administration costs than a regime with higher total
interpretive error and specification costs, the latter may be the preferable regime. See
Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 30-36 (1995). The “all else
equal” proviso allows for this possibility.
Our case for incorporation is not based on a complete analysis of all relevant
variables. Interpretive regimes affect a number of decisions of actual and potential
contracting parties, including whether to contract at all, the type of contract, contract
performance and the decision to breach. The decision to contract, for instance, is not an
exogenously fixed variable. Where performance deviates from the express terms of a
contract, use of commercial practice to interpret terms can increase the cost of performance
over the life of the contract. In some circumstances, this prospect can make not contracting
the preferred decision. A complete analysis of equilibria under different interpretive regimes
must estimate the aggregate effect of an interpretive regime on all variables, not just on
specification and interpretive error costs. This Article holds the parties’ preferences for
contracting and contract terms constant and estimates the effect of choice of regime on two
important variables. Its analysis is more managable because the estimation is of the effect of
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Critics of the incorporation strategy have focused exclusively on the former
and completely ignored the latter. Yet the chief virtue of the incorporation
strategy for interpretation is its promise to yield specification costs well below
that of plain meaning regimes. Even if plain meaning regimes have lower
interpretive error costs, the incorporation strategy is superior if its lower
specification costs outweigh its higher interpretive error costs. Moreover,
most critics treat their objections to Article 2 as objections to the incorporation
strategy generally. But Article 2 is just one possible institutional variant of the
incorporation strategy. All of the sources of interpretive error critics identify
can be substantially reduced, if not avoided, by making feasible alterations to
Article 2 that nonetheless preserve its incorporationist character.
This Article defends the incorporation strategy as a method of contractual
interpretation. Part II analyzes the debate between incorporation and plain
meaning regimes. After explaining the comparative and empirical nature of
this debate, we present the intuitive empirical case for believing that
incorporationist interpretive regimes will yield significantly lower
specification costs than plain meaning regimes. Part III considers recent
objections to the incorporation strategy for interpretation. These objections
identify several potential sources of interpretive error and offer both a priori
and empirical arguments to suggest these errors are likely to be extensive in
any incorporation regime. We argue that these criticisms overstate the
probable extent of interpretive error under Article 2, and that all of the kinds
of interpretive errors identified can be significantly reduced by feasible
changes to Article 2. Part IV describes the salient features in Article 2 that
implement the incorporation strategy and presents possible amendments to
reduce the extent of the interpretive errors identified in Part III. Given the
distinction between the incorporation strategy and its implementation, Article
2 can accommodate these amendments without abandoning the incorporation
strategy. Part V concludes by summarizing the argument for favoring the

interpretive regimes on the likely costs of making particular decisions. The full case for and
against incorporation would estimate the range of decisions affected by such regimes.
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incorporation strategy for interpreting contracts among a heterogeneous group
of contractors: Compared to a plain meaning regime, the lower contract
specification costs of a carefully designed incorporation regime will outweigh
its higher interpretive errors costs.

II. The Structure of the Incorporation Debate
The contemporary debate about the role of commercial norms in contract
interpretation typically pits the incorporation strategy against a plain meaning
regime. Although the notion of plain meaning at work is seldom clarified, for
our purposes we need only roughly describe it. We understand “plain
meaning” to be rule- or convention-based sentence meaning independent of the
particular context of sentence use. Plain meaning is literal sentence meaning.4
We also count as plain meaning approaches ones that exclude commercial
custom, even if they rely on other contextual evidence to determine meaning.
This extension of “plain meaning” preserves the contrast between the
incorporation strategy and plain meaning regimes. It is of course another
matter whether literal sentence meaning exists or is useful in resolving the
range of interpretive disputes litigated. Because we defend the incorporation
strategy against plain meaning regimes, we need not take a position on either

4

Philosophers standardly assume that literal sentence meaning exists, as do some
legal theorists. See, e.g., Donald Davidson, Truth & Interpretation 247 (1984), John R.
Searle, Speech Acts 19 (1969), Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intention of
Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in Law & Interpretation: Essays in Legal
Philosophy 356, 363-65 (Andrei Marmor ed. 1995), Frederick Shauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Supr. Ct. Rev. 213,
251-53. For scepticism about the existence of plain meaning, see Stanley Fish, Doing What
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies
508 (1989), Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373, 378 (1982).
Contrary assessments of the trend in recent caselaw appear in Margaret N. Kniffin, A New
Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality,
74 Or. L. Rev. 643 (1995), Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1131, 1159-71 (1995).
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matter.
Although the contemporary incorporation debate arises in response to
Llewellyn’s explicit adoption of the incorporation strategy in Article 2, it has
precisely the same structure as the classic and familiar debate between the
subjective and objective theories of intent in the common law of contract. The
same considerations that easily vindicate the objective theory of intent in
contract law structure the debate between plain meaning and incorporation
interpretive regimes in both contract and sales law. However, because plain
meaning and incorporation regimes are both versions of objective theories of
intent, these considerations do not so easily settle this debate.
The first lesson taught in first-year contracts is that contractual intent is
objective rather than subjective. Even though one of the parties can prove that
he understood the contractual term “dog” to mean cat, courts will interpret the
term “dog” to mean dog. The lesson seems counterintuitive. The law of
contract is designed to vindicate parties’ intent, yet one party’s subjective
understanding of the meaning of the terms of his contract is, by itself,
irrelevant to a court’s interpretation of those terms.5 The counter-intuition
rests on the erroneous presumption that subjective intent is static rather than
dynamic. The party who assigns an idiosyncratic meaning to a contractual
term might be surprised the first time he learns his subjective view is irrelevant
to its judicial interpretation. But he will not be surprised again. The next time
he enters into an agreement, the party will be careful to use terms according
to the interpretation a court is likely to give them. Thus, if courts refuse to
interpret terms according to the parties’ subjective intent, parties will align
their subject intent with the “objective” intent courts enforce. Contractors’
choice of terms, and the subjective meaning they assign to them, is therefore
a function of the contractors’ expectation of how courts will interpret
contractual terms. Contractual behavior can be explained and predicted only
5

Of course, if one party can prove that both parties shared his idiosyncratic
understanding of a contractual term, courts will enforce the term according to that
understanding.
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by a dynamic rather than static model.
The purpose of a theory of contractual interpretation, therefore, is not
merely to select an interpretive rule that is most likely to reflect the parties’
subjective intent. This goal can be secured by any interpretive rule that allows
parties to predict the likely interpretation of their contractual terms with
reasonably certainty. As between equally predictable interpretive rules, the
best rule allows the parties to secure their desired interpretation at least cost.
Consider an interpretive regime, for example, that enforced key contractual
terms only if they appeared on an extensive menu of judicially constructed
terms of art. A court would find that an agreement that did not use these terms
to specify its key provisions too indefinite and therefore unenforceable. Such
a regime would provide an extremely high degree of predictability of judicial
interpretation of contract terms. But this predictability would come at a price.
Parties would be forced to choose between creating a legally unenforceable
agreement or incurring the costs of learning and using the terms on the judicial
menu, which might nonetheless vary from the terms they most prefer in their
contract. The price of predictability, therefore, is the inefficiency of the
resulting contract: Whenever the terms of a contract are at variance with the
parties’ most preferred terms, the expected joint value of the contract at the
time of formation will be sub-optimal.6
Thus, a perfect interpretive rule not only enables parties to predict a
court’s interpretation of contractual terms with complete certainty, but also
allows parties to specify their desired contract at no cost. Real world
6

This assumes that contractors always prefer to maximize the joint value of their
contracts ex ante and that their most preferred terms correspond to the most efficient terms.
Of course, the former does not entail the latter. Contractors might mistakenly believe their
most preferred terms will maximize the joint value of their contract ex ante. But the
economic analysis of contract presumes that the parties’ preferences provide the best method
of approximating the most efficient terms for contracts. The plausibility of this claim stems
from the claim that the market will select against parties who include inefficient terms in
their contracts, and will favor the evolution of commercial norms that will guide contracting
preference formation.
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interpretive regimes, therefore, face an unavoidable trade-off between
maximizing the predictability of contractual interpretation and maximizing the
ability of the parties to specify the most efficient terms for their contracts. To
maximize the ability of the parties to specify their most preferred terms, the
parties’ costs of specifying their most preferred terms must be minimized.
Thus, all else equal, the optimal regime minimizes the sum of interpretive error
and specification costs.7 The costs of interpretive error consist in the losses
due to both the prospect and actual incidence of interpretive error. The
prospect of interpretive error leads to sub-optimal reliance losses. These
losses consist in the foregone benefits of the increased reliance that would be
efficient in a regime of interpretive certainty, and the direct and opportunity
costs of taking affirmative precautions to hedge against the prospect of
interpretive error. The actual, rather than prospective, incidence of
interpretive error leads to detrimental reliance losses. Specification costs are
the costs parties incur in specifying their most preferred terms, such as
learning and selecting from a judicially chosen menu of express terms.8
The justification for the objective theory of contractual intent is based not
merely on the claim that it yields a high degree of predictability of contractual
interpretation and thus a low prospect of interpretive error. It also turns on the
low specification costs produced by the objective theory. The proposition that
7

Again, the “all else equal” proviso holds the costs of administering an interpretive
regime constant across all regimes. See note 2 infra.
8

Specification costs provide the upper bound of the aggregate costs attributable to
inefficient contractual terms: The loss in the expected joint value of a contract due to a
failure to specify the most efficient terms cannot exceed the costs of specifying the most
efficient terms. Otherwise, rational parties would incur the costs of specifying the most
efficient terms rather than incur the larger loss in the expected joint value of their contract.
Note that under the hypothetical interpretive regime in the text, the costs of securing the
most desired terms will be infinite when the parties desire a term not contained in the
judicially specified menu. In that case, the upper bound of the aggregate costs attributable to
inefficient contractual terms is the entire expected joint value of the contract: Some contracts
will have a positive expected joint value only if they contain a term not contained in the
judicial menu.

Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt

9

the objective theory will yield a high degree of interpretive predictability is
based on two claims. The first is that most terms have a relatively clear,
objective “plain” meaning, which consists in their most common
interpretation. Because most people know the common interpretation of most
terms, both contractors and judges ordinarily will be able accurately to
determine objective meaning, and contractors will be able accurately to predict
the likely interpretation of their contractual terms. The second is that the costs
of learning a term’s plain meaning will be lower on average than the costs of
learning any alternative meaning these terms might be given. This second
claim also supports the proposition that the objective theory of intent will yield
low specification costs. The lower the costs of learning the judicially
recognized meaning of terms, the lower contractors’ specification costs.
Further, under the objective theory, parties in principle will always be able to
include any term they prefer in their contract. Unlike the hypothetical
interpretive regime that limits parties to a finite list of judicially recognized
key contractual terms, the objective theory offers contractors all of the English
language, which presumably provides an array of terms, each with plain
meanings, sufficient to specify virtually any term parties might prefer.
At bottom, the case for the objective theory of intent is comparative. The
objective theory of intent will yield an equilibrium producing a sum of
interpretive error and specification costs. The choice between the objective
theory and any competing theory is decided by determining which theory is
expected to yield the equilibrium producing the lower sum of interpretive error
and specification costs. If most English language terms have a clear, common,
“plain” meaning known to most contractors and judges, or learned at low cost,
these costs will not be great. Whether an alternative regime can produce an
even lower sum of these costs remains an open empirical question.
The case for the objective theory of intent is traditionally made by
comparing it to a purely subjective theory of intent. The objective theory of
intent is defended on the ground that it yields an equilibrium with lower total
interpretive error and specification costs than a purely subjective theory of
intent. The case is easily convincing. Contractors and courts cannot

10
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determine or verify purely subjective intent. Because the interpretive error
rate by courts and contractors under a subjective intent regime would be high,
the total interpretive error costs would be high. Contract specification costs
would also be high because parties would have great difficulty specifying
terms with meanings courts would reliably enforce. In contrast, if terms have
an objective and verifiable plain meaning, the objective intent regime will
clearly lead to an equilibrium with much lower aggregate interpretive error and
specification costs. The move from subjective to objective intent in first-year
contracts takes a class or two at most.
But the choice between objective and purely subjective theories of intent
presents a false dichotomy. Most terms have multiple meanings that can be
described along continua of objectivity and verifiability. If many terms have
multiple objective meanings, the issue is not whether objective theories of
interpretation should be preferred over subjective theories. Rather, it is how
we should choose among various possible objective theories. The main
objective competitor to plain meaning regimes are incorporation regimes.
Incorporation regimes, like plain meaning regimes, are objective because they
interpret contractual terms in light of objective and verifiable commercial
practices. Thus, unlike the debate between objective and purely subjective
theories of intent, the intramural debate between plain meaning and
incorporation regimes is far more difficult to assess. Both regimes constitute
objective theories of interpretation and both require trade-offs between
reductions in interpretive error costs and reductions in specification costs. The
debate is a contest between competing empirical intuitions.
There seems to be a consensus that plain meaning regimes are likely to
lead to lower interpretive error costs than the incorporation regimes. Plain
meaning regimes posit a fairly clear set of nondomain-specific, common
meanings associated with most terms, whereas incorporation regimes posit a
set of fairly clear but domain-specific meanings. Even assuming both the
generic “plain” meaning, and the more specialized domain-specific meanings
are equally clear, we would expect a higher rate of interpretive error under
incorporation regimes because they require judges (and contractors) to choose
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among the various possible meanings of terms. Under a plain meaning regime,
the judicially recognized meaning of every term is unique. The only possible
source of interpretive error is a misinterpretation of the plain meaning by
contractors or judges. Under an incorporation regime, however, contractors
and judges can mistakenly identify the domain for which a term’s meaning is
determined, in addition to misinterpreting the meaning of the term within that
domain. Thus, there is only one opportunity for interpretive error under plain
meaning regimes. Incorporation regimes, however, present a second
opportunity for interpretive error in addition to same opportunity presented
under plain meaning regimes. Because the two types of mistakes are not
correlated, incorporation regimes would be expected to have a higher rate of
interpretive error than plain meaning regimes, all else being equal.
But the comparative strength of the incorporation strategy is its potential
for producing lower specification costs than the plain meaning rule. The key
insight of the incorporation strategy is that contractors naturally and costlessly
use terms that have domain-specific meanings. These terms presumably have
evolved to address the particularized needs and expectations of contractors
within a given domain. Their efficiency is analogous to the efficiency of terms
of art within academic and technical disciplines. Terms of art allow
participants familiar with a particular discipline effectively to communicate a
complex thought with the ease of one specially defined word or phrase that is
widely understood within the discipline.9 Similarly, it would sometimes be
cost-ineffective for some contractors to restate their understanding of all the
dimensions of their contractual agreement using the plain meaning of terms.
Indeed, some specialized or context-specific terms carry with them an array
of implications that might be difficult even to bring to mind, let alone commit
to paper. Nonetheless, just as the full connotations of even the plain meaning
of terms can be specified by English speakers only when presented with a
particular contextualized application, the implications of specialized
contractual terms will be clear to the contractors, and every other participant
9

See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 9-11 (1992)
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in their trade or industry, only when particular contingencies arise in their
relationship. They will nonetheless “know it when they see it.”
If courts interpret contractual terms by attempting to determine whether
the parties intended to invoke their plain or domain-specific meaning, the
specification costs for parties might be lower than under a plain meaning
regime. Under an incorporation regime, contractors can use the terms that
express their intent most effectively at least cost. Contractors will choose a
less efficient term over a more efficient term whenever the additional cost of
specifying the most efficient term exceeds the gains from using the more
efficient term instead of the less efficient term. The incorporation strategy can
save contractors specification costs by allowing them to use domain-specific
meanings customized to suit the needs and expectations of their contracting
context. A plain meaning regime imposes on parties the additional costs of
either translating the understandings already carried by the domain-specific
meanings of available specialized terms into an equivalent statement using the
plain meaning of terms, or settling on a less efficient contractual term that can
be specified at a lower cost.
Moreover, the plain meaning rule requires contractors to make sure they
are not mistakenly relying on a domain-specific meaning rather than a plain
meaning. In a complex contractual setting, it may prove extremely costly, and
perhaps impossible, to identify all the unwritten interpretations of contractual
terms that the contractors naturally and unconsciously presume to be mutually
understood. Even when contractors knowingly operate under a plain meaning
regime, they will sometimes fail to realize that their understanding of the
meaning of a term, particularly commonly used industry terms, will
nonetheless not be judicially recognized. To be sure, such mistakes might be
less frequent over time. But as long as domain-specific meanings exist, such
mistakes are unlikely to disappear entirely.
Thus, the contest between plain meaning and incorporation regimes turns
on competing empirical hunches. Which is larger, the interpretive error costs
saved under a plain meaning regime, or the specification costs saved under an
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incorporation regime? Any comparative analysis of plain meaning and
incorporation regimes that focuses exclusively on relative interpretive error
costs is seriously incomplete. It must also take into account relative
specification costs. The case for the incorporation strategy rests on its claim
to significantly lower specification costs than plain meaning regimes.
In Part III, however, we set aside this comparative question to consider the
likelihood of interpretive error under incorporation regimes. The criticisms that
allege extensive interpretive error under the incorporation strategy, we argue,
are overdrawn and one-sided. They either exaggerate the likely extent of
interpretive error under incorporation regimes or fail to acknowledge that the
sources of interpretive error they identify apply equally to plain meaning
regimes.

III. The Critique of the Incorporation Strategy
Three different sorts of charges have been made against the incorporation
interpretive strategy and in favor of a plain meaning regime. Although often
not distinguished from each other, each charge asserts the likelihood of a
particular form of interpretive error. For ease of references, we refer to the
charges respectively as “the encrustation critique,” “the existence critique,”
and “the informal norms critique.” The existence and informal norms critiques
are supported by both a priori reasoning and empirical studies. For each
critique, we describe the kind of interpretive error it identifies. Our objective
is to isolate the sources of these errors in order to clarify how they might be
reduced by the amendments to Article 2 that we suggest in Part IV or by an
alternative incorporation regime. Where appropriate, we also argue that these
critiques either exaggerate the likely extent of interpretive error under an
incorporation regime, or fail to acknowledge that similar errors are likely to be
equally extensive under a plain meaning regime.
A. The Encrustation Critique

14
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The first critique of the incorporation strategy focuses on the mechanics
of the incorporation process of Article 2. Article 2 requires judges to interpret
contractual terms in light of commercial practice. But once courts have made
an initial determination of the meaning of a term, based at least in theory on
an inquiry into relevant commercial practices, they appear reluctant to engage
in that inquiry again. Instead, they appear to treat such determinations as
canonical. Thus, although courts might initially employ the incorporation
strategy, their initial interpretations become “encrusted” as virtual precedents.
Courts subsequently disfavor any interpretations inconsistent with these
encrusted interpretations.10 One suggestion is that courts are predisposed to
treat statutory interpretation in a static, precedent-bound, fashion, rather than
the dynamic fashion contemplated by the incorporation strategy. Thus,
incorporation implemented by Article 2, rather than through a common law
system, might account for this judicial interpretive intransigence.
The judicial practice of one-time incorporation is inconsistent with the
goal of interpreting contractual terms in light of their evolving meanings. If
parties understand their contractual terms in light of evolving commercial
practices, encrustation will lead to interpretive error. If parties recognize and

10

The classic encrustation critique is presented in Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985). Encrustation describes two
phenomena. The first is a status quo bias in favor of default terms. The status quo bias
weights default terms by resolving ambiguities in the meaning of express terms to preserve
the continued application of default terms to the contract. See Russell Korobkin, The Status
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998), Marcel Kahan &
Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd
Behavior and Cognitive Bias, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347, 359-62 (1996). The second is the
reliance on precedent to determine the customary meaning of contract terms. This
interpretive practice results in a failure to recognize changes in customary meaning. Because
a decisionmaker can interpret express terms without consulting default rules while also not
recognizing changes in commercial practice, this second kind of encrustation can occur
without the first. Both kinds of encrustration lead to a failure to acknowledge clear efforts
by contractors to opt out of default rules or (stale) custom.
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respond rationally to the judicial practice of one-time incorporation, their costs
of specifying their most preferred terms will increase. If courts will not
interpret contractual terms in light of current commercial practices, parties will
have to incur the costs of making explicit any of their understandings at
variance with outdated practice, or settle for the sub-optimal interpretation of
their contractual terms according to the outdated practice. The costs of “opting
out” of the encrusted interpretations of their terms are exacerbated by the
tendency of courts to disfavor such opt-outs. If courts refuse to interpret terms
in light of evolving commercial practice, the value of attempting to “opt out”
of encrusted interpretations is reduced. Even if parties incur the costs to
provide an otherwise clear opt out, courts might nonetheless refuse to enforce
the parties’ interpretation. This practice thus reduces the expected joint value
of all contracts by depriving parties of the ability to specify their most
preferred terms.
Encrustation is a potentially serous problem for incorporationists. The
tendency of courts to make one-time interpretations of terms instead of
continually updating their interpretations in light of evolving practice is
inconsistent with the implementation of the dynamic incorporation process
contemplated by the incorporation strategy. The tendency to disfavor even
clear efforts to opt out of encrusted interpretations constitutes simple
interpretive error. How serious a problem encrustation presents depends on
the relative frequency of interpretive error resulting from a failure to recognize
changes in commercial practice or a bias against clear opt-outs. These in turn
depend on how the incorporation strategy is implemented.
But plain meaning regimes are likely to suffer from shortcomings similar
to those caused by encrustation. First, encrustation undermines the
incorporation strategy because it prevents parties from easily invoking the
current customary meanings attached to their contract terms. It thus raises the
parties’ specification costs. But plain meaning regimes do not even attempt
to enable parties to invoke customary meanings a minimal cost. They instead
require parties to communicate their customary understandings according to
the plain meaning of the terms they use. Thus, although encrustation erodes
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some of the expected savings in specification costs under the incorporation
strategy, the expected specification costs under plain meaning regimes will be
even higher. Second, encrustation undermines the incorporation strategy
because judges refuse to honor parties’ attempts to opt out of the customary
meanings assigned to their contract terms. Again, this judicial practice raises
expected specification costs under the incorporation strategy. But if judges
favor the customary meaning of contract terms when they interpret under an
incorporation regime, we would expect them to favor the plain meaning of
terms a plain meaning regime. For example, if contractors state that their
quantity terms are estimates, judges might nonetheless hold the parties to the
plain meaning of their quantity term. It is difficult to understand why judges
would be biased in favor of the customary meaning of terms under an
interpretive regime that accords primacy to customary meaning, while not
exhibiting a similar bias in favor of the plain meaning of terms under a regime
that accords primacy to plain meaning.
B. The Existence Critique
The existence critique argues, on both an empirical and a priori basis, that
commercial practices might be less extensive and less clear than proponents
of the incorporation strategy have supposed.11 The extreme form of this
critique suggests that commercial practices suitable for incorporation might not
even exist. Were this the case, the incorporation strategy at best would be a
useless interpretive strategy. Attempts to employ the strategy would end in a
vain attempt to identify relevant commercial practices. At worst, fact finders
might wrongly believe that a commercial practice exists and thus mistakenly

11

The empirical claim is illustrated by Lisa Bernstein’s empirical study of the
codification efforts by merchant associations around the turn of the century and merchant
responses to proposed Article 2. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of
Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter Questionable Empirical Basis]. The a priori claim is illustrated by Richard
Craswell’s argument that trade practices might not exist because of their ineliminably
contextual nature. See Richard Craswell, Does Trade Custom Exist, this Volume.
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interpret a contract term in light of the non-existent commercial norm. But the
extreme critique must overcome an extremely strong pre-theoretical empirical
presumption that wide-spread, identifiable, and effective commercial practices
do exist. The near-universal insistence by merchants of all kinds that their
conduct is governed, in large measure and important respects, by relatively
clear commercial norms justifies a demand that evidence be presented for their
non-existence. To date, only one empirical study has been presented in
support of the existence critique.
Lisa Bernstein has recently offered a case study to support the claim that
“usages of trade and commercial standards, whose geographic reach is
coextensive with the reach of the relevant trade, is a legal fiction rather than
a merchant reality.”12 Her study examines the debates surrounding merchant
industry efforts to codify commercial customs in the hay, grain & feed,
textiles, and silk industries near the turn of the century. She argues that these
debates, as well as interview evidence and testimony of merchant associations
when Article 2 was proposed, reveal wide-spread disagreement among
merchants regarding the commercial customs in their trade. Bernstein’s study
constitutes a worthwhile preliminary effort to uncover the nature and extent
of commercial custom. But it does not make a convincing case against the
existence of the kind of commercial practice posited by the incorporation
strategy.
The most important limitation of Bernstein’s study is that, even by its own
lights, it demonstrates at most that there were few, if any, uniform, national
customs in many commercial industries around the turn of the century.
Bernstein concedes that her data supports the claim that local customs existed
at the time of these debates.13 Indeed, the very codification efforts giving rise
to the debates she examines indicate that at least industry members themselves

12
13

Questionable Empirical Basis, p. 7.

In a footnote, she does express some minor scepticism about even this claim,
however. See Questionable Empirical Basis, p. 9, n. 26.
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believed that an extensive and important set of customs existed. Their
objective was not to create trade rules out of whole cloth but to unify industry
customs and thereby eliminate pre-existing, wide-spread, differences between
local customs. Thus, Bernstein’s study at most provides some evidence that
uniform industry-wide commercial customs may not have been very extensive
around the turn of the century. If the incorporation strategy required such
customs to exist, Bernstein’s study might provide reason to doubt its viability
at least at the time Article 2 was created.
But neither the incorporation strategy in general nor Article 2 in particular
requires that uniform industry-wide commercial practices exist. Indeed, the
commentary to Article 2 itself states that usage of trade should be used to
interpret the language in contracts so that it means “what it may fairly be
expected to mean to parties involved in the particular commercial transaction
in a given locality or in a given vocation or trade.”14 If Bernstein’s study is
correct, the incorporation strategy at the turn of the century would have been
useless in interpreting contracts between merchants in localities with different
customs. But within localities, Bernstein’s study strongly supports rather than
undermines the existence of precisely the extensive and robust customs the
incorporation strategy anticipates.15
14

U.C.C. § 1-205, com. 4 (emphasis added). See Joseph H. Levie, Trade Usage
and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, N. Y. U. LAW
REV. 1101, 1107 (1965)
15

In fact, the very evidence on which Bernstein’s principally relies for the claim
that no uniform, industry-wide practices existed often provide strong and direct evidence of
the existence of relatively clear local customs. Consider the National Hay Association
debates Bernstein quotes as support for the claim that there was no uniform customary
understanding of what constituted a “bale of No. 1 hay.” The passage she includes in the
text of her article quotes a member as stating if one were to “[p]ut twenty bales of different
grade hay along that room, . . . there will not be five men among you who will agree” on
whether each bale contains no. 1 hay. Questionable Empirical Basis, p. 10. But in a
footnote, Bernstein quotes members at subsequent conventions as stating that “Grades
cannot be expected to suit the South, North, East and West with the same degree of
satisfaction” and that “What is considered as No. 1 Timothy, for example, in one producing
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As a critique of the incorporation strategy, Bernstein’s study has at least
two other weaknesses. First, the dearth of uniform, trade-wide customs in the
early part of the century provides slight evidence that such customs do not
exist now.16 As Bernstein repeatedly acknowledges, the express purpose of the
codification efforts she studied was to unify industry customs.17 At the turn
of the century, trade economies were just beginning their transformation from
a local to a national and international market. The codification efforts likely
coincided with the rising nationalization of the American economy. Far from
evidencing a lack of commercial custom, these efforts demonstrate the
centrality of custom to industries. As the need to compete in the national
marketplace became immediate, merchants likely felt they could not wait for
a nationally uniform customary practice to evolve as local customs had
evolved. The codification efforts suggest that the American economy had
grown faster than the rate of customary evolution. Significant secular changes
in domestic markets over at least the last half century make earlier trade
practices poor evidence of contemporary practices.
Second, although Bernstein claims the evidence she considers

section may be considered as No. 2 Timothy in another producing section, and still of
another grade in the consuming section to which it may be shipped.” Questionable
Empirical Basis, p. 10, n. 34. Bernstein’s basis for concluding that no uniform, industrywide customary understanding of the meaning of “no. 1 hay” existed is that the evidence
suggests instead that there existed many relatively clear but conflicting local customary
understandings of the meaning of the term, “No. 1 hay.” Thus, the same evidence that
supports Bernstein’s conclusion that no uniform, industry-wide standard for grades of hay
existed is itself equally strong evidence of the existence of relatively clear local customary
understandings (of the meaning of “No.1 grade hay” in the present example.)
16

See Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International
Sales, VA. J. INT. LAW (forthcoming).
17

Bernstein correctly notes that the codification efforts themselves do not
demonstrate the paucity of national, uniform customs. There are a variety of important
reasons for codifying even relatively clear and uniform customs. See Bernstein,
Questionable Empirical Basis, p.29, n.132.
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demonstrates that industry-wide customs did not exist, much of the evidence
at most establishes that some customs were not ideally precise. For example,
Bernstein reports that members of the National Hay Association disagreed
over whether the term “carload” meant ten tons or twelve tons.18 Such
evidence at most establishes that customary understanding was not always
sufficiently precise to resolve any possible interpretive dispute. Assuming the
debates accurately reflect the lack of consensus in the industry over the
definition of a “carload,” custom could not be invoked to adjudicate a dispute
between merchants over whether a contract calling for a carload of hay to be
delivered would be satisfied by a 10 ton rather than 12 ton shipment of hay.
But on this evidence, it is plausible to suppose that custom does establish that
an 8 ton shipment would not constitute a “carload” and that a 12 ton shipment
would constitute a “carload.” Thus, evidence of imprecise customs is not
evidence of no custom at all. The incorporation strategy is useful even if it
incorporates imprecise customs, so long as those custom serve at least to
define a range of reasonable and unreasonable disagreement over the meaning
of contract terms.
The empirical case against the existence of commercial practice is
unconvincing. However, the existence critique, in either its empirical or a
priori form, can be cast more modestly. The modest existence critique
concedes that fairly extensive and robust commercial practices are likely to
exist but maintains that by their nature they will be difficult for judges to
verify and so incorporate. This critique properly identifies and undermines the
naive view of commercial practices that conceives of them as bright-line rules
easily identifiable from within or without the profession they govern. It rightly
reveals commercial practices to be subject to precisely the same kind of
interpretive difficulties presented by ordinary terms in any language. In both
cases, their meaning is seldom reducible to a simple, easily stateable finite set
of propositions, but rather is largely contextual. Although one might be able
to state some relatively clear “core” instances of the application of any given

18

Questionable Empirical Basis, p. 12, n. 48.
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term, the application of most terms must await a particular context for its
resolution. Even then, reasonable people might disagree about its proper
application. Meaning is both contextual and fluid, and therefore characterized
by a constant evolution in which one ambiguity is clarified only by raising
another.
Clearly, the incorporation strategy for contractual interpretation would be
almost useless if it required commercial practices to take the form of brightline rules. Few such practices are likely to exist. Determining the content of
commercial practices engages the same interpretive enterprise required to
understand the meaning of ordinary language. This hardly presents an
insuperable obstacle to the incorporation strategy. The difficulties of
interpreting the content of commercial practice make it almost inevitable that
judges will make mistakes in identifying and incorporating commercial
practices. In some cases, judges might believe they have identified a
commercial practice when in fact there is no such practice.19 In other cases,
they might correctly believe there to be a commercial practice bearing on the
correct interpretation of a term but mistakenly interpret the content of that
practice. Incorporation strategies can reduce the incidence of these errors.
They can provide specifically designed provisions to alert the trier of fact to
the possibility that commercial practice sometimes will not exist, and to insure
against a finding that commercial practice exists when it does not. The modest
version of the existence critique supports only the conclusion that the
incorporation strategy be carefully implemented, not that it is bankrupt.

19

Interestingly, Bernstein points out a case in which the court concludes “that no
usage existed because the plaintiff contends [the word ‘prompt’] meant ‘by first available
ship’ and defendant that it meant thirty days. Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, p.
11, n. 42. On the one hand, this case illustrates that courts are capable of doing precisely
what Bernstein fears they will not do: Determine that no usage of trade exists when in fact
no usage of trade exists. On the other hand, the case provides a particular poor example of
how a court should make such a determination. The mere fact that the parties disagree ex
post about the interpretation of a term should be irrelevant to a determination of whether that
term has a customary meaning.
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C. The Informal Norms Critique
The informal norms critique points out that not all commercial practices
provide good evidence of the intended meaning of contractual terms. Some
commercial practices are indicative of “formal” norms, which parties intend
to be given legal effect, while others indicate “informal” norms, which parties
intend not to be given legal effect. The paradigm evidence of a formal norm
is provided by trade-wide contractual practices. For example, suppose that
90% of a representative sample of contracts for the sale of horses disclaimed
the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. There
is little question that this evidence establishes the existence of a commercial
norm of warranty disclaimer in sales of horses and that this norm is intended
by contractors to be given legal effect.
In contrast, informal norms are common commercial practices that are
intended by their practitioners not to be given legal effect. The paradigm
evidence of an informal norm is provided by trade-wide testimony that a
practice is not intended to be given legal effect. For example, suppose that
horse sellers routinely exchange or return the price for lame horses that were
accepted by their buyers. But every horse seller will testify that this practice
constitutes a legally optional accommodation, rather than a legally binding
obligation. In fact, they might well claim that the desirability of the
accommodation practice turns crucially on the availability of the legally
enforceable right to enforce the original trade. Such an informal practice
might arise in order to preserve an on-going relationship with a set of repeat
buyers.20 But the same transactors who follow these norms might do so only
because they take themselves to have preserved the option of enforcing their
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Bernstein calls these “relationship-preserving norms.” See Lisa Bernstein,

Merchant Law In a Merchant Court: Rethinking the code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) [hereinafter Merchant
Law]; See also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of
Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996).

Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt

23

more stringent contractual rights-- in this case, refusing to exchange or refund
the price of the horse. Contractors might invoke their stricter, contractual
rights whenever they consider their contracting partner to be behaving
opportunistically. Such behavior is more likely at the end of a contractual
relationship, when further contractual interaction between the parties is
unlikely, rather than in the middle of an on-going relationship.21 In specifying
the terms of their contract, parties attempt to create an optimal mix of formal
and informal norms to mediate their relationship. The informal norms critique
argues that the incorporation strategy, as implemented in Article 2, undermines
this optimal mix by formalizing informal norms.
Thus, the informal norms critique presupposes that contractors
intentionally select from a rich set of formal and informal norms an optimal
combination of norms to regulate their conduct. If the premise of the critique
is that incorporation of informal norms undermines this optimal mix, there
must be many formal and informal norms for courts to confuse with one
another. After all, if there are few commercial norms of any sort, as the
existence critique maintains, the problem of incorporating informal norms
would hardly present a serious problem.
Like the existence critique, the informal norms critique has both an a priori
and an empirical form. The a priori informal norms critique simply relies on
the fact there are some informal norms to conclude that an incorporation
regime such as Article 2 might incorporate an informal rather than a formal
norm. Clearly, the possibility exists that informal norms sometimes will be
incorporated under an incorporation regime, and clearly such incorporation is
undesirable in any interpretive regime. But in order to constitute a critique of
the incorporation strategy, much more is required than establishing the mere
possibility that an incorporation regime might incorporate some informal
norms. The informal norm critique must instead show that even well-designed
incorporation regimes inevitably would so frequently incorporate informal
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Bernstein calls these “end-game norms.” See Merchant Law, at 1796-97.
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norms that they would be inferior to most plain meaning regimes on that
account alone. There is, however, no reason to believe that all incorporation
regimes would incorporate informal norms frequently, let alone so frequently
that the entire incorporation approach must be rejected. In fact, there is no
reason to believe that Article 2 itself frequently incorporates informal norms,
or that feasible revisions to Article 2 could not insure that such instances
would be rare.
Article 2 does not explicitly direct courts to distinguish between formal
and informal norms. However, Article 2 clearly does not contemplate or
condone the incorporation of informal norms. No court applying Article 2
would intentionally incorporate informal norms. This is because an informal
norm cannot be evidence that the term is intended to be enforced. In other
words, the evidence goes to something that is not a term of the contract.
Indeed, the informality of a norm entails that no term in the contract at issue
can be interpreted as having a meaning governed by the norm. It is simply no
part of the parties enforceable set of obligations. Thus, any court that
identified a norm as informal must already have concluded that the norm
cannot be used as a basis for interpreting the meaning of the contract. The
court’s prior determination of the norm’s informality would constitute its
finding that the norm does not inform the meaning of any of the contract’s
terms.
Accordingly, the incorporation strategy is not embarrassed by commercial
practices reflecting both formal and informal norms. Instead, these practices
simply raise another potential source of interpretive error. Under Article 2, for
example, judges might mistakenly incorporate an informal norm in the process
of interpretation. The possibility is unexceptional. Judges can make mistakes
in passing on any aspect of the sales contract, from formation questions to
remedies. So the question is whether this kind of interpretive error will be so
extensive and costly that Article 2 and other incorporation regimes will be less
efficient than available non-incorporation interpretive regimes. The answer
depends on the precise design of the incorporation process and on the base rate
of observable contractual activity that is inconsistent with the legal duties
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contractors intentionally undertake in their contracts. When both variables are
taken into account, the probability of erroneous incorporation of informal
norms is unlikely to be as extensive as the current literature suggests.
Consider how Article 2 directs courts to determine the existence of a
commercial norm in the process of interpreting contractual terms. The
predicate for a finding that a usage of trade exists is an empirically observable
regularity in the conduct of a majority of contractors in the relevant trade.22
The predicate for a finding that a course of dealing or course of performance
exists is a pattern of observable behavior by the parties.23 Before the finder of
fact can incorporate a norm under Article 2, it must first have evidence of
observable regularities in the conduct of merchants or the parties to the
contract in dispute. Unless the finder of fact ignores this requirement, no
norm, whether informal or formal, can be incorporated into an agreement in
the absence of a prior finding of the existence of a pattern of observable
conduct that serves as evidence of the norm. Therefore, in order for an
informal norm to be incorporated under Article 2, there must be some pattern
of behavior by merchants in the relevant trade or the parties to the contract in

22

A usage of trade is “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance . . . as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question.” U.C.C. § 1-205(2). Section 1-205(2) requires that “[t]he existence
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts.” The Code commentary emphasizes
that “[a] usage of trade . . . must have the ‘regularity of observance” specified,” and provides
that “full recognition is thus available for new usages and for usages currently observed by
the great majority of decent dealers.” U.C.C. § 1-205, com. 5.
23

“A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction . . . .” U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (emphasis added). “Course of dealing under
subsection (1) is restricted, literally, to a sequence of conduct between the parties previous
to the agreement.” U.C.C. § 1-205, com. 2 (emphasis added). “Where the contract for sale
involves repeated occasions for performance by either party . . . any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.” U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (emphasis added). “A single occasion of conduct does not
fall within the language of [the section defining course of performance].” U.C.C. § 2-208,
com. 4.
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dispute that provides observable evidence of the norm.
Erroneous incorporation of informal norms is possible, therefore, only to
the extent that such norms are evidenced by observable patterns of behavior.
The principal empirical premise of the incorporation strategy is that most such
observable patterns of behavior consist in conduct to which contractors take
themselves to be entitled under their contract. Correspondingly, relatively few
patterns of behavior are understood by contractors as exceeding their contract
entitlements and therefore requiring permissions or waivers of rights. The
existence of informal norms establishes that some observable patterns of
behavior fall into the latter category. But not all informal norms are evidenced
by observable patterns of behavior. And those that are might correspond to a
relatively small proportion of observable regularities in commercial behavior.
Our supposition is that the Code’s empirical premise is correct. The
literature suggests that informal norms most commonly will develop in the
context of relational, rather than discrete, contracts. Many, perhaps a majority,
of the transactions governed by Article 2 are discrete.24 Because informal
norms are unlikely to play a significant role in discrete contracting, the risk of
erroneous incorporation of informal norms in this context is relatively low.
But even in relational contracts, which might describe a large number of Codegoverned transactions, most behavioral regularities evidence norms that are
likely to be formal.25 Therefore, most behavioral regularities are good

24

See Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 131, 150 (1998)
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The mere existence of a regularity of commercial behavior at odds with the plain
meaning of a contractual term alone is no evidence of the existence of an informal norm.
The behavior is equally consistent with the parties intending that the contract term be
interpreted by their behavior under the contract, not plain meaning. For instance, suppose
the sales contract calls for delivery of “10 bushels of No. 1 wheat per month.” Seller, having
difficulty fulfilling all its orders, delivers 8 bushels every previous month. Buyer does not
complain. The question is whether the contract calls for delivery of 10 bushels in a
subsequent month. Delivery of 8 bushels previously is equally consistent with the following
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evidence of formal norms. Informal norms counseling flexibility are surely
important in their domain, but their domain is quite limited, even within the
relational setting.
Thus, even if the Code indiscriminately incorporated all norms evidenced
by observable regularities of conduct, most of the norms incorporated would
be formal. Even if fact finders inferred formal norms from behavioral
regularities in all instances, they would be right more often than wrong. But
of course, the fact finder under the Code does not indiscriminately apply
norms to the contract. Evidence of a norm’s informality is relevant to
persuading the fact finder not to incorporate it. Under Article 2, there are two
principal methods of demonstrating the existence of an observable regularity
of conduct: expert testimony and evidence about statistical regularities. Expert
testimony sometimes can straightforwardly ascertain whether most transactors
regard the norm as legally binding. The experts will presumably speak
directly to that question. Disagreement among experts is no more of a problem
here than elsewhere. But much of the evidence of commercial norms might
consist simply in the presentation of evidence of statistical norms--mere
frequencies of a given behavior in the trade, in past dealings between the
parties, or in the course of performance under the contract in question. This
evidence will not settle whether there is an informal or formal norm. The rate
of erroneous incorporation of informal norms will be directly affected by the
manner in which the trier of fact seeks to determine whether such statistical
norms are informal or formal. Our observations suggest that as a statistical
matter, there is a high probability that the regularity indicates the existence of
a formal, rather than informal norm. But when the reverse is true, the only
method for reducing the probability of erroneous incorporation is either to seek
expert testimony or require that the trier of fact have some level of relevant
expertise itself.
two interpretations of the contract’s quantity term: (1) “10 bushels” (which Buyer can insist
on but has not to date); or (2) “10 bushels or 8 bushels when Seller has difficulty fulfilling
its orders.” Behavior inconsistent with the plain meaning of the quantity term does not show
that an informal norm is operating.
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Empirical studies could demonstrate the prevalence of interpretive error
in Article 2 resulting from the incorporation of informal norms. They could
therefore provide either direct or indirect evidence of the efficiency of one
kind of regime over the other. Direct evidence of the regimes’ comparative
efficiency is a basis for inferring either the absolute or relative costs of
interpretive error and specification costs under either kind of interpretive
approach. Evidence of the absolute costs of interpretive error and
specification under only one regime by itself allows no inference about the
relative merits of the two approaches. In order to determine which regime is
likely to be more efficient, the absolute costs of interpretive error and
specification under the alternative approach must be estimated. Only partial
and inconclusive evidence of the relative merits of each regime is given by an
empirical study presenting data on the relative costs of interpretive error, for
example, but not specification under each regime. To determine which regime
is likely to be more efficient, data would be needed concerning the relative
costs of specification under each regime.
An empirical study, however, might reveal only indirect evidence of the
comparative efficiency of these regimes. If both regimes are available to
contractors, and the majority of contractors choose one consistently over the
other, where the only plausible explanation for the choice is that contractors
prefer it, then that regime is likely to be the most efficient. Similarly, if only
one regime is made available without cost, and a second regime can be created
by contractors willing to incur the costs of its creation, choice of the second
regime by the majority of parties is strong indirect evidence of its superior
efficiency.26
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Of course, the failure of a majority of contractors to create an alternative
interpretive regime would not constitute evidence that such a regime is less efficient than the
prevailing regime. Transition costs, network externalities, learning costs, and structural
obstacles to collective action could explain why contractors might continue to utilize a less
efficient regime even when the aggregate costs of create and utilizing a more efficient regime
would be exceeded by the benefits of such a regime. In contrast, overcoming these obstacles
to create and utilize an alternative regime is fairly strong evidence that the regime is more
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The only empirical evidence offered to refute the incorporation strategy
have been Bernstein’s data.27 She presents them as a challenge to “the
fundamental premise of the Uniform Commercial Code’s adjudicative
philosophy, the idea that courts should seek to discover ‘immanent business
norms’ and use them to decide cases.”28 Bernstein studied the arbitration
system adopted by the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA). The
NGFA opted out of the Code’s interpretive regime and created its own
formalistic arbitration system. Its system substitute trade rules and a
formalistic interpretive system for the Code’s reliance on usage of trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance. Indeed, according to Bernstein,
arbitrators sometimes even note that they are prohibited from taking into
account trade usage inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. Her
interviews with grain and feed merchants suggest that members of the NGFA
prefer their formalistic system to the Code’s regime because it allows them to
achieve their most desired mix of informal and formal norms to govern their
contractual relationships. There is no question that the likelihood of
interpretive error due to incorporation of informal norms is much lower for
contracts adjudicated under the NGFA regime than for contracts adjudicated
under the Code’s regime.
Bernstein’s case study might be taken to provide direct or indirect
evidence of the relative size of interpretive error costs in incorporation and
non-incorporation regimes. The NGFA study gives direct evidence that one
kind of interpretive error is less under the NGFA regime than under the Code
regime. If the incidence of other kinds of interpretive error is the same in both
regimes, the study would provide incomplete but direct evidence bearing on
the relative efficiency of both regimes. The study is incomplete because it
does not purport to determine the relative specification costs under each
regime. But even without an empirical study of relative specification costs, it
efficient than the one it replaces.
27
28

Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note ?.

Id. at 1766.
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seems clear that the specification costs under the NGFA regime will be no
greater, and in fact will probably be much less, than the specification costs
NGFA members would face if forced to adjudicate their contracts under the
Code regime.
Ordinarily, an interpretive regime that excludes extrinsic evidence of the
meaning of contract terms increases specification costs relative to a regime that
does not. This is because parties under a non-incorporation regime will have
to incur the costs of using terms with plain or pre-defined meanings to express
ideas more easily expressed using terms with context-specific meaning, or
settle for less efficient contractual terms. But the NGFA provides its members
with an extensive set of pre-defined terms whose meanings are entirely derived
from common commercial practice in the grain and feed industry. By
providing such a tailored list of pre-defined express terms, the NGFA
eliminates the chief advantage of incorporation regimes over non-incorporation
regimes. The specification costs for NGFA contractors under the NGFA
regime are certain to be lower than under any incorporation regime. This is
because contractors achieve all the benefits of incorporation by incorporating
all relevant commercial practice in their pre-defined trade rules and terms
rather than in the course of adjudication. The adjudicatory process therefore
can be dedicated solely to the task of enforcing pre-defined terms, without
thereby imposing on contractors any additional costs of aligning their
contractual practices with these pre-defined terms. Because the NGFA
intentionally selects the pre-defined terms its members most prefer terms-terms with meanings reflecting the most common commercial practices in the
grain and feed industry-- a strict construction rule in favor of the pre-defined
meanings for these terms can be adopted without increasing contractors’
specification costs. In this way, the NGFA system thereby eliminates the
ordinary tension in adjudication between interpretive strategies that minimize
interpretive error costs and those that minimize specification costs. The
NGFA’s strict construction regime, then, appears to have both lower
interpretive error costs and lower specification costs than the incorporation
strategy. Thus, it might appear that the NGFA study provides good evidence
that non-incorporation regimes are likely to be superior to incorporation
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regimes.
The NGFA study, however, establishes only that the NGFA provides a
superior interpretive regime for the members of the NGFA. It says nothing
about the majority of contractors whose agreements are governed by Article
2. The NGFA study illustrates the well-known efficiencies of custom-tailoring
rules of contractual interpretation to the needs of specific kinds of contractors.
If all contractors shared the same commercial understandings, needs, and
practices, as do the members of the NGFA, the incorporation strategy would
serve no purpose. An NGFA-like regime instead could be employed to govern
all sales contracts. There would not be an unavoidable trade-off between
customizing contractual terms in the process of adjudication, thereby reducing
specification costs, and reducing interpretive error by adhering to the strict
construction of pre-defined terms. Instead, the pre-defined terms themselves
could be customized to suit all parties’ contractual preferences, eliminating the
need to attempt such customization during the course of adjudication. Thus,
if contractual preferences are homogeneous, customization can be achieved ex
ante, at the stage of pre-defining a menu of contractual terms, rather than ex
post, during the adjudicative process. If customization is achieved ex ante,
there is no need to attempt customization ex post, and therefore no need to
introduce the additional risk of interpretive error associated with ex post
customization attempts.
More generally, if contracting parties shared a narrow set of commercial
understandings, needs, and practices, there would be no need for a generalized
sales law such as Article 2. Of course, an NGFA-like regime that combined
custom-tailored, pre-defined terms with strict construction adjudication would
optimize contractual interpretation for such an homogenous group.29 But the
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As Bernstein acknowledges, the NGFA system is narrowly tailored to the
uniform and idiosyncratic needs of its members. For example, it is suitable only for
transactions in which most significant contingencies are well-known in advance, most
contractual arrangements are simple, the benefits of national uniformity outweigh any
advantages of local variance, and mitigation is typically simple and universally available. In
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whole point of the incorporation strategy is to accommodate the impossibility
of ex ante customization in a sales law designed to govern an extraordinarily
heterogenous population of contractors. The incorporation strategy is
explicitly designed to tradeoff the risk of increased interpretive error in order
to capture some of the efficiencies of custom-tailored interpretive rules. Karl
Llewellyn’s gambit is that the efficiency gains the incorporation strategy
makes possible will outweigh the interpretive error costs it occasions. The
NGFA example provides a perfect solution to the Code’s interpretive
challenge by assuming away the problem.
The NGFA example also might be indirect evidence of the superior
efficiency of a non-incorporation regime over an incorporation regime. The
willingness of NGFA members to incur the costs of creating the NGFA strict
construction regime to opt out of the Code’s incorporation regime might be
taken to indicate the superiority of strict construction regimes over
incorporation regimes. But no such inference is justified. First, opting out by
the NGFA members at most is evidence of the NGFA’s superior efficiency
over Article 2's particular version of the incorporation strategy. It provide no
evidence that a strict construction regime other than the NGFA is superior to
Article 2's incorporation strategy or even that the NGFA is more efficient than
any incorporation regime other than Article 2.
Second, and more important, the NGFA study does not even demonstrate
that the NGFA regime is superior to Article 2. As explained above, the
superiority of the NGFA for NGFA members has no bearing on the merits of
Article 2's incorporation strategy. Indeed, Article 2 explicitly invites
contractors to opt out of the Code’s regime when doing so would be efficient.
The ability of NGFA members to opt out of the Code’s regime in part
vindicates, rather than refutes, the design of Article 2 by demonstrating the
efficacy of its opt-out provisions. This is because the Code anticipates that
addition, its trade rules and term definitions are custom-tailored for grain and feed
transactions.
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groups of homogenous contractors sometimes will be able to secure gains from
forming a distinct adjudicative regime, which exploits the advantages of ex
ante customization, that exceed the costs they must incur to form and operate
such a regime. The Code does not try to provide a more efficient regime for
such contractors than they can provide for themselves. Instead, it is designed
to be the most efficient regime for governing a set of heterogenous contractors
whose contracting preferences cannot, except in very broad terms, be
effectively anticipated in advance. The Code’s comparative inefficiency
would be indirectly shown only if some individuals with largely heterogenous
preferences would opt out of the Code for a private interpretive regime.
Instead, the NGFA example proves the unsurprising exception but leaves the
rule of incorporation completely intact.

E. Summary
Each critique correctly identifies the possibility of one kind of interpretive
error but fails to estimate the likely extent of interpretive error. Because every
interpretive regime produces some interpretive error costs in order to reduce
specification costs, the only relevant question is whether the incorporation
strategy has greater aggregate interpretive error and specification costs than
alternative interpretive regimes. The question therefore is a comparative one.
We have speculated that the kinds of interpretive error identified are unlikely
to be so great as to clearly disqualify the incorporation strategy outright.
Indeed, if the error rate were so high, most merchants would at least attempt
to opt out of most of the Code’s provisions. There is no doubt, however, that
the chief liability of the incorporation strategy is its vulnerability to
interpretive error. Part IV canvasses measures that might be taken to improve
the interpretive error rate under Article 2. We argue that such changes are
entirely feasible and realistic. Once in place, these changes could dramatically
reduce the current interpretive error rate under Article 2.
IV. Implementing a Defensible Incorporation Strategy
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The incorporation strategy for interpreting contracts directs courts to
interpret the meaning of contract terms in light of relevant extrinsic evidence,
such as trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance. But it does
not specify how a court is to take such evidence into account. Interpretive
regimes can implement the incorporation strategy in many different ways.
They can vary along a number of crucial dimensions of institutional design.
First, they might allocate the responsibility for deciding whether a usage of
trade, course of dealing, or course of performance exists to different decisionmakers. The decision could be allocated to the court, a lay jury, or a merchant
jury. Second, they might apply different standards for proving the existence
of extrinsic evidence. Although precise formulations of such standards are
notoriously difficult, familiar standards range from a “preponderance of
evidence” to “clear and convincing evidence.” And they might apply different
standards for the kind of proof that can be offered to prove the existence of
extrinsic evidence. For example, one regime might require evidence of
statistical regularity, while another might require expert testimony. Third,
some regimes might provide a menu of safe harbors that allow the parties to
reliably signal their preference for having their contract interpreted by a
particular sort of extrinsic evidence. Finally, some regimes might add
presumptions to aid in justifiably inferring facts that are difficult or costly to
determine. Thus, every incorporation regime will permit extrinsic evidence to
be used to interpret contract terms only when a fact finder finds that the party
with the burden of proof sustains its burden by offering admissible evidence
satisfying the relevant standard of proof. But each regime can specify
different fact finders, burdens of proof, standards of proof, safe harbors, and
presumptions.
Article 2 explicitly or implicitly specifies the fact finder, burden of proof,
standards of proof, safe harbors, and presumptions for the incorporation of
extrinsic evidence. Article 2's core interpretive provisions are § 1-205(3) and
its parol evidence rule, § 2-202. Section 1-205(3) states the order of priority
given to different sorts of evidence in interpreting contract terms. It requires
express terms to be construed as consistent with course of dealing and trade
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usage “wherever reasonable.”30 Express terms control only when a consistent
construction is “unreasonable.” Fairly understood, § 1-205(3) gives priority
to the plain meaning of term over trade usage, course of performance and
course of dealing in such cases. Section 2-202 states what sort of evidence is
admissible to interpret contract terms. The section instructs courts to allow
trade usage, course of performance and course of dealing to “explain or
supplement” the terms of even an integrated writing. Official Comments
explicitly reject the “lay dictionary” and the “conveyancer’s” reading of terms
in commercial agreements.31 Article 2 allows parties a safe harbor by which
they can limit the sort of evidence used to interpret their agreement. They can
do so by “carefully negat[ing]” any usage of trade, course of performance or
anticipated course of performance they prefer not to have applicable to their
deal.32
Article 2 relies on a mix of Code and extra-Code law to set the other
elements needed for interpretation. Interpretation of contract terms is allocated
the fact finder, except when the court finds a writing to be integrated.33 The
existence and content of trade usage, course of performance, and course of
dealing also is left to the fact finder.34 Article 2's definition of trade usage
places a modest constraint on fact finding, requiring that it have a “regularity

30

See U.C.C. §§ 1-205(1) (course of dealing), 1-205(2) (usage of trade), 2-208(1)
(course of performance). The proposed revision of Article 2 increases the extent of
incorporation by repealing current Article 2's interpretation of shipment terms. Proposed
U.C.C. § 2-309 instead requires that shipment terms be “interpreted in light of applicable
usage of trade, and any course of performance or course of dealing between the parties.”
Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2--Sales § 2-309 (May 1, 1998).
31

See U.C.C. § 1-205 com. 1.

32

See U.C.C. § 2-202 com. 2; infra note .

33

See U.C.C. § 2-202. Section 1-205(2) requires the court to interpret written trade
codes when they are established to embody relevant trade usage.
34

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205(2); the allocation of issues of course of dealing and
course of performance to the trier of fact is implicit.
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of observance in a place.” The associated Official Comment makes clear that
only statistical regularity, not longevity, is required for a finding of trade
usage.35 Although Article 2 sometimes expressly allocates the burden and
standards of proof,36 it does not do so in the case of the interpretation of
contract terms. Burdens and standards of proof therefore are implicitly left to
extra-Code law, presumably applicable under § 1-103. The few presumptions
that bear on the interpretation of contract terms, such as contra proferentum
rules or the bindingness of trade usage on newcomers, are products of
decisional law, not Article 2's provisions.
An accurate assessment of the incorporation strategy requires a clear
distinction between the incorporation strategy itself and the many possible
incorporation regimes that might implement it. Because the incorporation
strategy does not require a single specification of any particular institutional
element, many different incorporation regimes are possible. A criticism of one
particular incorporation regime, therefore, does not by itself constitute a
criticism of the incorporation strategy generally. A defect in one incorporation
regime does not demonstrate that all other possible and feasible incorporation
regimes are likely to have a similar defect.37 Moreover, even if a criticism is
effective against a particular incorporation regime, that regime might be
amended to address the particular defect the criticism identifies. Thus,
35

See U.C.C. § 1-205 com. 5.
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See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (accepting buyer has burden of proving
nonconformity in goods tendered), U.C.C. § 1-201(8) (defining “burden of establishing”).
37

For instance, the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts
includes trade usage as part of the parties’ agreement, except when the usage is
“unreasonable.” See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT
Principles for International Commercial Contracts art. 1.8(2) (1994). The exception in
effect restricts the sort of extrinsic evidence relevant to interpreting the express terms of the
parties’ agreement. And, of course, the restriction is itself vague and therefore potentially
increases the rate of legal error in interpretation. This might make UNIDROIT’s
implementation of the incorporation strategy a bad one. But this fact does not undermine the
incorporation strategy generally.
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because Article 2 describes just one way in which the incorporation strategy
can be implemented, criticisms of it neither condemn Article 2 itself nor the
incorporation strategy generally. After all, if Article 2 is subject to compelling
criticism, it might be amended to avoid the criticism. The resulting
interpretive regime might well be sufficiently similar to the original Article 2
regime that we would not say the criticism required abandoning the regime.
More important, whether or not Article 2 survives its own amendment, the
resulting regime might not only qualify as incorporationist but constitute a
more thoroughgoing incorporationist regime than Article 2.
The incidence of the interpretive errors identified by the critiques we have
considered can be significantly reduced by including a number of feasible
provisions in incorporation regimes such as Article 2. The existence and
informal norm critiques are each directed at interpretive error produced by
faulty inferences from regularities in behavior, either under a contract or in
similar contracts. The existence critique holds that trade usage sometimes or
often does not exist where the incorporation strategy finds it. The informal
norm critique maintains that courts sometimes or often fail to distinguish
formal from informal norms, wrongly interpreting the contract to include
norms not intended by the parties to be enforceable. Both critiques charge that
incorporation induces courts to find commercial practice where there is none.
Under Article 2, the interpretive errors identified are the product of a trier
of fact (or a court, if the agreement is integrated) drawing incorrect inferences
based on particular sorts of evidence. These errors can be reduced by
selecting a better decisionmaker or requiring that interpretation be based on
more reliable evidence. Accordingly, a combination of a superior fact finder,
superior evidentiary bases, or higher standards of evidence can be specified.
As with any interpretive approach, a combination of devices are available to
the incorporationist. Contract interpretation therefore could be allocated away
from relatively inexpert, generalist trial courts or juries and toward specialist
courts or merchant juries. The Delaware Court of Chancery illustrates the
former possibility. The Court hears most of the corporate cases brought in
Delaware, acts as a fact finder, and has a developed expertise in corporate
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matters. It is well positioned (and motivated) to understand the background
against which corporate matters appear. In the case of contract interpretation,
such specialized courts are well positioned to understand when parties are
likely to incorporate commercial practice and when not.38 At the very least,
they are better positioned than generalist trial courts or juries. Interpretive
error thereby can be reduced by the choice of judicial interpreter.
Merchant juries are another possibility. They can be assigned the task of
interpreting the terms of the contract, taking into account commercial practices
of which they are familiar. In early drafts of Article 2, Llewellyn proposed a
merchant jury.39 The elimination of his proposal from the final version of
Article 2 means that inexpert fact finders both find commercial practice and
interpret the terms of a sales agreement in light of it. This sort of institutional
design is not inevitable. Merchant juries, potentially familiar with the
commercial practices in issue, arguably make fewer interpretive errors than lay
juries. They are less likely to wrongly find trade usage, for instance, where
none exists or a “thick” and detailed practice where there are only “thin” and
sparse regularities of behavior. Merchant juries, potentially being industry
experts, are less likely to mistake local trade usage for widely shared
commercial practice. Certainly parties often select arbitrators familiar with the
practices surrounding the transaction for which the parties have contracted.
The reasons for doing so are complex and sometimes need have nothing to do
with knowledge of the decisionmaker selected. However, the contracting
parties’ choice of arbitration is consistent with a preference for the interpretive
advantage provided by an expert familiar with the relevant commercial
38

See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized
Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995); cf. Richard L.
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
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See Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code:
1940-49, 51 S. M. U. L. Rev. 275, 292-93 (1998); James Q. Whitman, Commercial Law
and the American Vol.: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 97 Yale L. J. 156 (1987); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of
Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV.. L. REV. 520 (1987).
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practices.40 Merchant juries, which reduce the rate of interpretive error, make
litigation a closer substitute for arbitration.
Restricting evidence, raising standards of proof, and adopting stronger
legal criteria for commercial custom also can reduce interpretive error. If the
existence critique is correct, regularities in industry practice are seldom
pronounced or detailed enough to be trade usage. An appropriate response to
such paucity of trade usage might be to restrict evidence of industry practice
to written industry codes or corroborative testimony by industry experts.41
This makes good sense given a general regulatory and contractual preference
for conditioning obligations on verifiable variables. Alternatively, admissible
evidence could be restricted to terms appearing in standard form contracts in
the relevant trade.42 Another response would be to require more regularity of
commercial practice, both in scope and longevity. Pre-Code law apparently
did this, by requiring that trade usage be “ancient or immemorial” and

40

See, e.g., Julia A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los
Angeles: International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 917, 926 n.45 (1997), A.W.B. Simpson, The Origins of Futures Trading in
the Liverpool Cotton Market, in Essays for Patrick Atiyah 179, 183 (P. Cane & J. Stapleton
eds. 1991).
41

Although Article 2 in principle allows for expert testimony to establish the
existence and content of commercial norms, it is surprisingly rare. See Imad D. Abyad,
Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code
Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429 (1997); Cf. Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Report on the Second Draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act, 1 Uniform
Commercial Code Drafts 281, 335 (E. S. Kelly ed. 1984) (comment to § 1-D considering
whether formal statements of usage by merchant organizations should create a presumption
of the background of understanding of terms).
42

The restriction risks error when the forms do not reflect changes in trade usage.
Standard forms in the grain trade apparently are slow to react to changes in shipping
practices; see Albert Slabotzky, Grain Contracts and Arbitration 15-16 (1984); cf. Raj
Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated Trade
Usages, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 863, 907-08 (1995) (same for currency “switches”).
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prevalent.43
The amendments to Article 2 that would be expected to reduce the
interpretive errors identified by the existence critique would also be expected
to reduce the interpretive errors identified by the informal norms critique. But
the problems each critique identifies are importantly different. Whereas the
existence critique calls for measures to insure that fact finders do not find
custom where it does not exist, the informal norms critique calls for measures
to insure that fact finders do not find formal norms where only informal norms
exist. Thus, unlike the existence critique, the informal norms critique does not
deny that there are regularities in commercial behavior generally, and in the
contracting parties’ behavior in particular, that reflect enforceable obligations.
It notes that these regularities sometimes instead will reflect unenforceable
obligations instead (informal norms). The problem therefore is not to design
rules in the face of an assumed infrequent phenomenon such as formal trade
usage. It is to design rules to induce the accurate detection of a frequent
phenomenon: formal norms evidenced by usage of trade, course of dealing,
and course of performance. If party-specific behavior is more likely to reflect
informal norms than general commercial behavior, an incorporation regime
might well assign different burdens and standards of proof to trade usage than
for course of dealing and performance. For example, a bare statistical
regularity might suffice to prove a formal usage of trade exists, while both a
statistical regularity and expert testimony might be required to prove the
existence of a formal course of dealing or course of performance.
Reduction of the interpretive errors identified by the encrustation critique
requires altering another way in which the incorporation strategy is
implemented. The critique speculates that the self-contained nature of Article
2 induces courts to rely on precedent interpreting Code provisions dependent
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See U.C.C. § 1-205 com. 5; cf. Levie, supra note ?.
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on commercial custom and to ignore changes in that custom.44 Because the
tendency postulated is not irreversible, encrustation can be avoided by altering
the way in which courts regard Article 2. Accordingly, the incorporationist
response is similar to its other responses: altering the particular way in which
Article 2 is implemented. A straightforward alteration is to make Article 2
even less self-contained by making it more reliant on extra-Code developments
in commercial custom. It is common for treaties lacking a mechanism for
centralized implementation to include provisions calling for national courts to
interpret them with an eye to uniformity.45 Article 2 could be amended in the
same sort of way. It could contain an explicit injunction to courts to avoid
relying on case law to determine trade usage, for instance. The injunction
would help force them to gauge trade usage by looking to contemporary
commercial practice. It more effectively vindicates the incorporationist
strategy.
The variety of feasible ways of implementing the incorporation strategy
means that it has resources to adjust to the presence of interpretive error costs.
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See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law:
Optimal Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts, this Volume. An
alternative speculation is that encrustation is the result of doctrinal devices such as precedent
or the taking of judicial notice about commercial practice. Encrustation may have no
statutory genesis. For the operation of judicial notice of trade usage under pre-Code law, see
Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings and the Common
Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1201, 1203 (1955); cf. Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan,
417 F. Supp. 552, 559 (W.D. Okl. 1976).
45

See, e.g., Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art 7(2),
supra note ? ; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, art. 3(2) (1997), U.N.
Doc. A/51/628 (1996), Draft Uniform Rules on Assignment of Receivables Financing, art.
8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/Wp.9323 (1997), Model Law on Legal Aspects of Electronic
Data Interchange and Related Means of Communication, art. 3(2), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/426
(1996), and UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, art. 6
(1988), 27 Int’l. Legal Mat. 931 (1988), UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring,
art. 4, 27 Int’l. Legal Mat. 943 (1988), Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment (Tent. Draft, Nov. 1997).
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This is illustrated by specific strategies for pursuing incorporation that
arguably fail to take interpretive error seriously. Robert Cooter, for example,
proposes that courts proceed by identifying existing commercial norms and
discerning the likely strategic structure of interactions in which the norms
arise.46 If the strategic structure of interactions tends to produce efficient
outcomes, courts should use the commercial norms identified to interpret or
supplement parties’ contracts. By doing so, according to Cooter, courts need
not inquire directly into the efficiency of contract terms or interpretation of
them. Cooter’s proposal arguably induces high interpretive error costs (as well
as high administrative costs). Although courts need not inquire directly into
the efficiency of terms, Cooter requires them to assess two variables: relevant
commercial norms and the strategic structure of likely interactions. Because
the variables are independent, the likelihood of judicial error is greater than if
courts were directed only to identify commercial norms. Further, error in
detecting the strategic structure of interactions probably is itself high. This is
because the strategic structure of an interaction sometimes must include the
way in which parties describe the array of payoffs and strategy choices. The
mathematical structure of interactions, such as payoffs and strategy choices,
are not enough always to explain equilibrium outcomes.47 Because judicial
access to parties’ descriptions of their interactions is at best imperfect and can
be gamed by parties in litigation, the interpretive error costs associated with
Cooter’s proposal are likely to be significant. Whether they are higher than
the costs associated with directly inquiring into the efficiency of terms or their
interpretation needs to be determined.
The proposal still might produce lower aggregate interpretive error costs
46

See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996), Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized
Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994).
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See Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON J. 533 (1995), Michael
Bacharach, Variable Universe Games 255, in FRONTIERS OF GAME THEORY (K. Binmore
et al. eds. 1993).
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than its competitors. If it does not, then, holding specification costs constant,
Cooter’s specific suggestion for incorporation of course should be rejected.
However, the failure of the suggestion still leaves a range of other feasible
ways of implementing the incorporation strategy. And they might well fair
better by producing greater reductions in interpretive error costs. For instance,
a variant on Cooter’s suggestion recommends that courts only determine
relevant commercial custom, rather than the strategic structure of interactions.
By not requiring that courts detect strategic structures, a likely significant
source of interpretive error is eliminated. The recommendation also clearly
provides recognizable means of implementing the incorporation strategy.
Even if unsuccessful, Cooter’s proposal therefore is only one of a number of
ways in which incorporation can proceed, and its rejection does not condemn
the incorporation strategy generally.
The array of possible ways of implementing particular incorporationist
strategies does not undermine their incorporationist character. Each
implementation still requires that commercial practice informs the meaning
assigned to contract terms. They differ only in how commercial practice
enters in the interpretive process. Of course, devices such as burdens of proof
have effects on whether contract terms will bear the meaning given them by
customary practice. An assignment of burden of proof to one who wants to
introduce trade usage, for instance, might make it more unlikely that trade
usage will be considered in interpreting a term. However, the reduced
likelihood does not mean that trade usage will not be successfully introduced.
It will depend on whether the evidence is available to the party having the
burden. Alternatively, a statutory menu of language which if used by
contracting parties will be taken to make trade usage inapplicable is possible.48
This limits without eliminating the circumstances under which commercial
practice will be used. Certainly both approaches remain significantly different
from plain meaning approaches to interpretation. According to them,
48

Cf. U.C.C. 2-316(2) (statutorily described warranty disclaimer language sufficient
to disclaim implied warranties of merchantability); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice:
A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Texas L. Rev. 51 (1992).
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commercial practice is never relevant to interpret the plain meaning of
contracts. Even impeccable evidence of relevant industry practice is to have
no effect on interpretation. Thus, implementing incorporation by adjusting
interpretive devices does not destroy the distinctiveness of incorporationist
strategies.
V. Conclusion
Incorporation of commercial practice in contract interpretation is best
suited to generalist commercial statutes or rules. Generalist commercial laws
cover a wide variety of transactions among contracting parties having
heterogeneous, transaction-specific preferences. In these circumstances,
interpretative approaches must take into account both interpretive error costs
as well as specification costs. The case here for incorporation in interpretation
argues that an incorporation strategy optimally minimizes the sum of
interpretive error and specification costs associated with contract
interpretation. The argument rests principally on four sensible empirical
assumptions. First, where party preference is heterogeneous, contracting
parties face high costs in signaling to third parties their understanding of
contract terms. Thus, specification costs are a variable that interpretive
approaches cannot ignore. By interpreting contract terms according to
commercial practice, the incorporation strategy saves parties most of the cost
of having to signal the aspects of that practice they want applicable to their
contract.
Second, despite the arguable lack of uniformity of trade custom at the turn
of the century, contemporary local and national trade customs are likely to be
quite extensive. Third, where norms exist governing heterogenous transactions
covered by a generalist law, they are more likely to be formal norms, intended
by the parties to be enforceable, than informal norms, not intended for
enforcement. On the whole, formal norms are likely to outnumber informal
norms because transactions cover both discrete and relational contracts,
informal norms are unlikely to govern discrete contracts, relational contracts
are unlikely to predominate discrete contracts, and even within relational
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contracts, formal norms are likely to predominate informal norms. Thus, the
rate of interpretive error in mistaking informal for formal norms probably is
low. Fourth, error costs associated with interpreting terms in light of
commercial practice can be reduced by adjusting the way in which
incorporation is implemented. This means that mistakes due to bias against
opt-outs of trade usage, misidentification of informal for formal norms, or
identification of trade usage where there is none, can be reduced by altering
burdens of proof, evidentiary bases and standards of proof, and the like.
Adjustment of these elements to affect legal error rates therefore can be made,
taking into account their effect on specification costs. In this way, marginal
interpretive error and specification costs can be gauged so as to obtain optimal
levels of both. The case for the incorporation strategy claims that, given these
four sensible assumptions, aggregate interpretive error and specification costs
are lower than under plain meaning interpretive approaches.
Empirical studies concerning the existence of trade usage or the rates of
informal and formal norms in particular industries are important for
incorporationists. In fact, they are essential to the incorporation strategy
because they affect the way in which it is implemented. For example, the
adjustment of standards of proof and evidentiary bases depends on the likely
rates of interpretive error. Thus, if trade usage is mostly local or “thin,” or if
most norms in a particular industry are informal, as Bernstein’s data might
suggest, then raising a standard of proof or restricting evidentiary bases might
be appropriate. Far from being incompatible with the incorporation strategy,
empirical data about the rate of informal norms or the limitations of trade
usage is necessary for an intelligent implementation of the incorporation
strategy. At the very least, the data require that incorporationists be sensitive
to interpretive error and specification costs. Our objection to the critiques of
incorporation is not that they fail to identify possible sources of interpretive
error associated with consulting commercial custom. It is that the critiques
either ignore specification costs, which favor incorporation, or ignore the
resources available to incorporation strategies to reduce the interpretive errors
they identify.
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